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MODELING TERRORIST RADICALIZATION
Aziz Z. Huq
[Forthcoming -- Duke Journal of Law and Social Change – (2010)]
Recent high-profile terrorism arrests and litigation in New York,
Colorado, and Detroit have brought public attention to the question of
how the government should respond to the possibility of domestic-origin
terrorism linked to al Qaeda. This symposium essay identifies and
discussing one emerging approach in the United States and Europe which
attends to the process of terrorist “radicalization.” States on both sides of
the Atlantic are investing increasingly in developing an epistemology of
terrorist violence. The results have implications for how policing
resources are allocated, whether privacy rights are respected, and how
religious liberty may be exercised. This essay traces the development of
state discourses on “radicalization” in the United States and the United
Kingdom. It argues that understanding this new “radicalization”
discourse entails attention to interactions between nations and between the
federal government and states as well as to the political economy of
counter-terrorism.
Academic analysis and critique of public and private discrimination
against Muslim Americans after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has
followed two tracks. In the first track, scholars have cataloged violations of
constitutional rights after 9/11.1 This is scholarship as penitential didacticism. By
enumerating atrocities, scholars hope to quicken sorrow and provoke behavioral
change. Blending the descriptive and the moralistic, they aspire to inculcate by
aversive example.2 In the second track, scholars take culture rather than law as
their target. This is scholarship as kulturkampf. The scholars identify popular
cultural depictions of Muslims qua terrorists as key catalysts for discriminatory


Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am very grateful to
Bernard Harcourt for insightful comments and aid. My thanks to Ellen Fisher and
Meredith Angelson who helped with research into this general area. Finally, I am very
grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which supported the original research.
1
The best of this genre bear witness at a granular level to the experience of rights
violation, see, e.g., TRAM NGUYEN, WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS NOW: UNTOLD STORIES FROM
IMMIGRANT AMERICA AFTER 9/11 (2005), or provide a synoptic analytic framework,
linking current policies to historical precedents, see, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54
STAN. L. REV. 953, 976 (2002). I too have written in this mode. See Aziz Huq, The New
Counterterrorism: Investigating Terror, Investigating Muslims, in LIBERTY UNDER
ATTACK: RECLAIMING OUR FREEDOMS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 167 (Richard C. Leone &
Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2007).
2
See Murad Hussein, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm
in Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 938
(2008); see generally Tracey Maclin, “Voluntary” Interviews and Airport Searches of
Middle Eastern Men: The Fourth Amendment in a Time of Terror, 73 MISS. L.J. 471
(2003).
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policies and attitudes.
They thus condemn the frequency of negative
representations of Muslims and Arabs in film, popular culture, and public
discourse3 as an invitation to or a legitimation of improper animus.4
This essay suggests a third approach to the discrimination question that is
especially salient at a time of fresh terrorism arrests in the United States and
increasing attention to domestic-source terrorism. This is scholarship as
epistemological archeology. Rather than looking at what the state does to Muslim
Americans or at how the media represents Muslim Americans, I suggest we should
look at how the state represents them. In particular, I suggest a focus on the
epistemic predicates of terrorism policies. North American and European
governments have recently mapping how individuals decide to commit acts of
terrorism. Governments term this process “radicalization.”5 While these
governments have long acknowledged and addressed the problem of terrorism, this
investment is a new development. This process develops “[n]ew slots . . . in which
to fit and enumerate people.”6 Investment in “radicalization” modeling pays
dividends in the form of legitimacy for policies of investigation and prosecution
bottomed on the state’s claim of expertise. The state’s epistemological assertion is
especially forceful in the terrorism domain because, unlike other areas of risk
regulation, from pandemic disease control to environmental catastrophes, it is a
field where the state claims to have privileged access to information and where it
has fewer academic competitors.
The resulting state taxonomies merit study for two reasons. First, claims of
state expertise redirect the vector and intensity of counter-terrorism policies,
particularly those concerning religious speech and conduct. Second, the state’s
epistemology of religious and ethnic identity also limits and channels opportunities
for political and religious expression for a larger minority population of Muslims,
Arabs, and South Asians in the United States and Europe.
Part I situates this project in a larger intellectual tradition generally
unfamiliar to the legal academy and explains why that tradition merits extension.
Part II examines “radicalization” policies on the state level in the United States, at
3

See, e.g., JACK SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES A PEOPLE
(2d ed. 2009); John Tehranian, The Last Minstrel Show: Racial Profiling, the War on
Terrorism and the Mass Media, 41 CONN. L. REV. 781 (2009); Tung Yin, Jack Bauer
Syndrome: Hollywood’s Depiction of National Security Law, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
279 (2008).
4
This work also suggests new forms of constitutional prohibitions ought to forestall
new violations. See Sunita Patel, Performative Aspects of Race: “Arab, Muslim, and South
Asian” Racial Formation After September 11, 10 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 61 (2005).
5
I retain quotation marks for the term “radicalization” through the essay. I do not
doubt individuals do, in fact, become persuaded to commit acts of terrorism. I use the
quotation marks to underscore that the “radicalization” under discussion is the discrete
discursive formation, not the social process itself.
6
IAN HACKING, HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY 100 (2002).
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the federal level, and then in the United Kingdom. Lengthy, perhaps tedious
exposition of divergent policies is warranted here given the absence of previous
descriptive accounts. Part III evaluates and critiques the trajectory of
“radicalization” policy along methodological, political economy, and
consequentialist grounds.
I should emphasize at the outset the tentative nature of my investigation.
My goal here is largely descriptive. I hope to persuade the reader that there is a
new form of state “expertise” being developed, and that this body of expertise
warrants scholarly attention.
I.
Governments generate policies based on understandings of social facts and
social dynamics. Like social scientists, governments value parsimony because
“[n]o administrative system is capable of representing any existing social
community except through a heroic and greatly schematized process of
simplification and abstraction.”7 These understandings can be the result of public
debate and deliberation, or they can emerge from investments of bureaucratic time
and expertise. In evaluating the risks of climate change for example, federal
government bureaucrats may look to published scientific studies, they may conduct
their own research, or they may rely on interest groups to bring them information.
The epistemic bases of government policy are almost always varied. The selection
of “simplification[s] and abstraction[s],” their upstream sources, and their
downstream effects, can all be isolated and studied.
To target terrorism, a government might wish to start off with some
understanding of who becomes a terrorist, and how the transformation happens.8
For the first five years after the 9/11 attacks there was little public information
about how North American and European states conceptualized the
“radicalization” process. But that is changing. In the past few years, American
state police forces, the United States federal government, and several European
governments have published policy documents describing how individuals turn to
political violence. The authors of “radicalization” literature attempt to construct a
descriptive taxonomy of terrorist motivations and interactions to enable prediction
of future acts of violence.9 “Radicalization” so defined appears to be a new object
of state scrutiny and epistemological investment.10
7

JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 54 (1998).
8
I do not deny that a government might not attend to these causal questions. States
fought crime and wars long before bureaucrats thought about their causes.
9
See generally Aziz Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in
Counterterrorism (2009) (draft on file with author) (discussing empirical problems
generated by pressure toward prophylactic responses in counter-terrorism).
10
I have failed to locate any documents from the relevant jurisdictions herein
discussed predating 9/11 that discuss “radicalization.”
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As the state turns to the production of “knowledge” and “expertise,” so too
must scholarship that attempts to understand counter-terrorism reorient itself. In
turning to epistemology to understand state practice, I am following a tradition
established by historian and cultural theorist Michel Foucault. Foucault argued that
“truth” could be characterized as “a thing of this world,” which is “centered on the
form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it . . . subject to
constant economic and political incitement.”11 Elsewhere, Foucault explored the
relationship between how government acts and “discursive formations,” i.e.,
“statements different in form, and dispersed in time [that] form a group [because]
they refer to one and the same object.”12 He urged scholars to focus inquiries on
“whether the political behavior of a society, a group, or a class is not shot through
with a particular, describable discursive practice” that in turn would “define the
element in politics that can become an object of enunciation.”13 This essay should
be understood in that vein.
Foucault’s lesson is emphatically not the facile one that knowledge is an
instrument in the hands of the powerful. In his histories, diffuse “band of experts”
organize “lots of hypotheses and prejudices and tidy theories” into a “postulated
set of rules that determine what kinds of sentences are going to count as true or
false in some domain.”14 What matters are thus not the rules themselves but the
conditions that make them count as “true.” These conditions enable “[the state] . . .
to do something new with people”; one can treat them as “disciplinary objects”
within a new field of possible identities and categories.15 Knowledge, on this
account, does not repress, it constitutes.16 To borrow Ian Hacking’s phrase, it is a
matter of “making people up,” not simply controlling them.17
More traditional political scientists have also studied the complex and
bilateral connection between state epistemological practices and state policies. Of
special note is the work of Yale anthropologist and political scientist James C.
Scott, who has traced a history of state efforts “to make a society [more] legible,”
i.e., more discernable and quantifiable.18 This desire for legibility, Scott explains,
is “a central problem in statecraft” insofar as it is an adjunct to the “classic state

11

MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITING 1972-1977 131 (Colin Gordon ed. 1980).
12
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 32 (A.M. Sheridan Smith
trans., Harper Colophon Books ed. 1976) (1969).
13
Id. at 194; see also EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 23 (1979) (adopting the concept
for the study of Western texts about the “Orient”).
14
HACKING, supra note 6, at 76-77.
15
Id. at 79.
16
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 11, 13843 (R. Hurley, trans. 1978).
17
See HACKING, supra note 6, at 99.
18
SCOTT, supra note 7, at 2, 13.
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functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion.”19 Increasing
legibility, Scott argues, augments a state’s capacity for control.20 The more the
state knows about the distribution of and variance in social practices, the easier it is
for it to direct the use of coercive force. As a correlative, “illegibility . . . has
provided a vital margin of political safety from control by outside elites.”21
There is, hence, a rich interdisciplinary tradition of studying the state’s
epistemic bases for public policies. This tradition, however, has not yet been
extended to the study of counterterrorism policies.
II.
This Part begins by examining the most influential and interesting of
governmental approaches to “radicalization” in the United States, which have
emerged at the subfederal level before turning to federal models. This Part then
outlines the development of “radicalization” policy in the United Kingdom.
A.
The trend in “radicalization” policy in the United States defies the
conventional wisdom in policy and constitutional law in that it is a state (New
York) government that has taken the lead in a national security matter.22 While the
federal government has been a laggard, the first, and perhaps most influential,
analysis of “radicalization” has emerged in a publication by the New York Police
Department (“NYPD”). In the wake of the New York study, the Pennsylvania
Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission issued a training
manual addressing “radicalization.” Because local and state police are on the front
lines of interacting with most urban Muslim-American communities, the analysis
adopted by state agencies may be especially significant as an index of frontline
policies.
At the threshold, however, federal and state sources diverge on their
assessment of the severity of the domestic-source terrorist threat facing the United
States. A decision to invest in understanding “radicalization” implies a geographic
distribution of terrorist risk where domestic source threats constitute a principal
share of the policy concern. Part of the work of the “radicalization” literature,
therefore, is to substantiate the claim that this is a policy problem meriting serious
attention.

19

Id. The process is never aimed at a perfect mapping: “No administrative system is
capable of representing any existing social community except through a heroic and greatly
schematized process of simplification and abstraction.” Id. at 22; accord id. at 309.
20
See id. at 77.
21
Id. at 54.
22
See, e.g., MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 24-39
(2000).
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The National Intelligence Estimate (“NIE”) addresses this issue in a July
2007 document entitled The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland. This analysis
picked out the growing strength of al Qaida in western Pakistan as the principal
threat. It argued that al Qaida retained the ability to send agents into the United
States from overseas.23 The NIE noted a “growing number of radical, selfgenerating cells in Western countries” and an expanding “radical and violent
segment of the West’s Muslim population.”24 But the NIE also observed that “this
internal Muslim terrorist threat is not likely to be as severe [in the United States] as
it is in Europe,” and that other “non-Muslim groups . . . probably will conduct
attacks . . . on a small scale.”25 Intelligence briefings produced during the 2008
presidential election campaign further downplayed domestic-origin terrorism.26
Congressional testimony from the National Counterterrorism Center (“NCTC”) in
March 2009 affirmed that assessment. The NCTC rejected the idea that there had
been “community-wide radicalization” of the Somali-American community in
Minneapolis after some young men from that city traveled to the Horn of Africa to
join the Islamist Shabab insurgency.27
By contrast, a report published by the NYPD identified a more serious
problem. It asserted that “jihadist ideology . . . is proliferating in Western
democracies at a logarithmic rate” and that “radicalization permeat[es] New York
City, especially its Muslim communities.”28 Unlike the federal assessment, the
state assessment was cast in terms of imminent and geographically specific
concern. A subsequent codicil to the report claimed the term “permeate” had been
used in the neutral sense of dissemination. But the tone and context of the NYPD’s
assessment suggested that the department viewed Muslim-Americans as a source
of significant threat.
23

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE
TERRORIST
THREAT
TO
THE
US
HOMELAND
5
(July
2007)
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf. The National Intelligence
Estimate is “the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on
national security issues and designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop
policies to protect US national security interests.” Id. at 2.
24
Id. at 7.
25
Id. at 7.
26
Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, Reduced Dominance is Predicted for U.S., WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2008, at A2 (discussing national security briefing given to 2008
presidential candidates, which de-emphasized terrorism in favor of climate change and
resource conflicts as major concerns).
27
Violent Islamist Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement
of Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center,
Directorate of Intelligence) http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/031109Liepman.pdf
[hereinafter Liepman testimony].
28
MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (“NYPD”),
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 8, 66 (2d ed. 2009),
(www.nypdshield.org/. . . /NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. . . [hereinafter
NYPD Report] (emphasis added).
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Echoing that assessment, Senator Joseph Lieberman, chair of the Senate’s
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, warned in 2007 of a
“rise of domestic terrorist cells, inspired by but not necessarily directly linked to al
Qaeda [as] an emerging threat to our nation’s security.”29 Senator Lieberman
further explained that the threat, in his view, was inextricably tied to the MuslimAmerican community: “We have thought that American Muslims were more fully
integrated into American society than Muslim communities in Europe.” He
continued, “I believe that remains true but, obviously, not for all Muslims in
America.”30 Senator Lieberman is one of the few political actors at the federal
level to endorse and promote the model of “radicalization” generated at the New
York state level.31
Corresponding to the variance in threat assessments, the first and most
prominent analysis of “radicalization” in the United States emerged at the state
level. The NYPD’s Intelligence Division published Radicalization in the West: The
Homegrown Threat in August 2007.32 Until that time, the NYPD had never
published an analytic report, and the change in approach was not explained. The
NYPD’s Report does not state why or by whom the document was commissioned.
There is no evidence that New York City’s democratic branches, its mayor and city
council, sought the report. Nor is there a clear statement about how the report was
intended to be used. The report vaguely explained that its aim was to “assist
policymakers and law enforcement officials . . . by providing a thorough
understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically.”33 But the Department
added a later “statement of clarification” to some public versions of the report,
29

Transcript of March 14, 2007 U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee Hearing on Islamist Radicalization at 2 (Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman)
[hereinafter
“Senate
March
14
Hearing
Transcript”].
Available
at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=2fb
6902f-72e9-45a6-b5b2-15389ed18ec3
30
See Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph Lieberman, Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, “Violent Islamist extremism: Government
Efforts to Defeat It” May 10, 1007. Checked quote against webcast available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=a3a
45e4d-8a9f-4a54-a245-f50743eb1b71
31
Which account is correct? Divergent assessments of the underlying risk of domesticsource political violence in the U.S. are hard to evaluate. There is no clear benchmark to
set them against. The most obvious metric is the frequency of attacks. But this is
obviously insensitive to fluctuations in the underlying number of immanent terrorist threats
within the United States. Moreover, since there have been no attacks in the United States
since 2001, the metric is also too lumpy to be of much use.
32
Rather confusingly, while the August 2007 version of the report remains on the
NYPD’s website, a different edition of the report, containing a “Statement of Clarification”
with responses to critics is available at New York City government’s public information
site. See http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/NYPD_ReportRadicalization_in_the_West.pdf. [hereinafter NYPD Report II].
33
NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 2.
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disclaiming any intention to be “policy prescriptive.”34 By rejecting any claim to
prescription, and by laying claim to a mantle of neutral expertise, the report
situated itself as a legitimating basis for subsequent policies.
Moreover, the NYPD report’s tone and content indicated an effort to set
and legitimate an agenda for “policy-makers” in state and federal political
branches. Suggestive of this advocacy goal, the report included a series of “Outside
Expert’s Views” from internationally recognized academics and policy experts,
each speaking admiringly of the Department’s expertise in “how to detect imported
terrorists, new converts and homegrown operators.”35 These “expert” views, rather
than supplementing the analysis of the report, validated its bona fides and
underscored its aspirations. Presumably, obtaining such imprimaturs of authority
was not cheap. The department’s efforts to secure evidence of its neutrality,
respectability, and reliability were consistent with a more ambitious account of the
report’s aims.36 The report, in other words, was an opening bid in “the creation of
a self-constituting class of experts located within a new knowledge.”37
The NYPD report’s analytic ambition also bespeaks a larger aspiration.
The authors used a broad scope, documenting ten case studies of alleged or
completed terrorist conspiracies: five from Europe and Canada and five from the
United States. However, the report has a narrow focus along a different axis: all
ten case studies were linked explicitly or implicitly to al Qaeda. The sample
population for the report comprised all terrorism incidents in the world, but the
actual sample included only terrorism explicitly or notionally connected to Islam.
Selection, clearly, was not random, but directed by an interest in certain forms of
terrorism.
Elaborating these case studies, the report perceives a “remarkable
consistency” in the “radicalization” process. The report proposes four stages to the
“radicalization” process, “each with its distinct set of indicators and signatures.”38
These are: 1) pre-radicalization; 2) self-identification; 3) indoctrination, and 4)
jihadization. In the last term of the sequence, a connection between religious belief
and terrorism is worked into the basic discursive matrix of the report. In a
noteworthy rhetorical move, these categories are vested with empirical certainty
and heft by graphical representations. The authors of the report included graphics
that chart, with apparently almost day-by-day accuracy, temporal transitions of
individual terrorists in particular cases from one stage to another.39 The level of
putative accuracy is surprising given concessions elsewhere in the report about the

34

NYPD Report II, supra note 33, at 11, 12.
Id. at 13, 15.
36
Consider by way of analogy law professors’ habit of larding star footnotes with
credits to celebrated colleagues.
37
HACKING, supra note 6, at 77.
38
NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 7.
39
Id. at 19, 54; see id. at 81 (timeline).
35
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necessarily fragmentary evidence of individual motivations.40 The degree of
accuracy in the “radicalization” graphs, however, is consistent with an effort to
establish the aura of academic credibility via a claim to precision that underlying
data cannot support.
The four stages of “radicalization” act as a funnel: once a person enters,
he or she might not reach “jihadization,” but will remain “a threat.”41 This has
expansive consequences. Consider the definition of the “pre-radicalization” phrase
stipulated by the report. Individuals are “pre-radical,” according to the NYPD’s
logic, when they live in geographic Muslim enclaves, which are “‘ideological
sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought”; when they are between 15 and 35
year old males; and when they are middle class and educated through at least high
school.42 That entire class of individuals is already in the funnel and thus a
potential “threat.” Cashed out in operational terms, the NYPD’s analysis means
that almost the whole young, male Muslim population of urban areas in the United
States constitutes a threat because they all are in the “pre-radicalization” stage.43
This is, to say the least, a surprisingly broad claim at odds with the ambient level
of terrorist attacks in the United States.
The body of the report provides case-by-case analyses of ten cases of
alleged terrorism drawn from incidents in Madrid, Amsterdam, London, Australia,
Toronto, Portland, Northern Virginia, Lackawana, and New York City. By
aggregating the case studies, the report claims to identify “typical signatures”
associated with each of the four phases. The “typical signatures” of the preradicalization phrase, for example, are “[b]ecoming alienated from one’s former
life”; “[g]iving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling and urban hip-hop gangster
clothes”; “[w]earing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard”; and
“[b]ecoming involved in social activism and community issues.”44 (A subsequent
version of the report contained a response to criticism by civil liberties advocates,
stating that “a greater degree of religiosity . . . cannot be used as a signature.”45
The main text of the report that alludes to these indicia, however, remains
unchanged and thus merits analysis). Signatures of the “jihadization” phase, in
turn, include the undertaking of “Outward Bound-type activities,” and, in one
striking passage, the owning of “wilted plants”, which may be a sign that “noxious
explosives” are being prepared in a location.46 The end of the four phrases is an
40

See id. at 10 (noting that the “subtle and non-criminal nature of the behaviors
involved in the process of radicalization makes it difficult to isolate or even monitor”).
41
Id.
42
NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 22-23. These minimal definitional, however, are
violated by the report’s own later examples, which include individuals who do not satisfy
the educational and class qualifications. See id. at 67 (James Elshafay).
43
Id. at 23.
44
Id. at 31.
45
NYPD Report II, supra note 32, at 12.
46
NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 44, 49. “Wilted plants” were seen in one British
apartment where explosives were being prepared. The report extrapolates from that
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acceptance of an “individual duty to participate in jihad” that precedes any
“operational planning for jihad or a terrorist attack.”47
In the wake of the NYPD’s report, the Pennsylvania Municipal Police
Officers’ Education and Training Commission issued a training manual entitled
“Radical Islam: A Law Enforcement Primer.”48 This training manual merits
attention as an elaboration of state-level operational approaches to
counterterrorism. The authors did not, however, include an explicit analysis of the
process of “radicalization” with anything like the NYPD report’s level of detail.
The Primer’s first section, entitled “Typologies and Misconceptions,” instead
contains a disordered sequence of terms, definitions, and notes on early Muslim
history.49 The discussion moves indiscriminately, and confusingly, between
historical and theological claims. It drifts from doctrinal issues such as a definition
of the “Sunnah,” to complex theological notions, such as the abrogation of early
verses of the Qur’an by later ones.50 The manual’s second section is entitled
“Radical Islam,” and begins with a one-page summary of Islamic theology from
the thirteenth century Ibn Taymiyyah to the twentieth century Sayyed Qutb.51 This
section gives the impression that a centuries-long sweep of Islamic intellectual and
theological development can be distilled down to a single thread: the endorsement
of violence for political ends. The third and final section continues the same theme,
identifying “modern radical groups,” including al Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad,
and Hezbollah, that share “five pillars of radical ideology” despite the fact that one
(Hezbollah) emerges from Shia Islam, which is quite separate from and often
antagonistic to the Sunni tradition from which the others emerge.52 While glossing
over elemental differences, the Primer’s mosaic of disparate facts communicates
the impression that the problem of violent terrorism is not linked only to a small
fraction of Muslims, but rather adheres in the structure and dictates of the faith
tradition itself.
B.

observation to the conclusion that viewing wilting plants generally should trigger concern.
47
Id. at 43. Note again the conflation of religious behavior and terrorism.
48
Municipal Police Officers’ Education & Training Commission, Radical Islam: A
Law Enforcement Primer (Bill Kaiser, ed., undated) [hereinafter “Pennsylvania Primer”].
49
Id. at 2-12.
50
Id. at 7-8. The idea of naskh, or abrogation, is complex and long-contested in
Islamic theology. See WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 68-74
(1997).
51
Pennsylvania Primer, supra note 48, at 13-19. It should go without saying that this is
a staggering feat of compression.
52
Id. at 20-23. This passage also conflates justifications for the violence with the more
prosaic notion of the five pillars of core practice in mainstream Islam. For an excellent
recent account of Shia political mobilization, including Hezbollah, that makes plain how
distinct it is from Sunni politics, see LAURENCE LOUËR, TRANSNATIONAL SHIA POLITICS
(2008).
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Whereas state models of “radicalization” have been powerfully informed
by a view about the underlying threat level and a normative vision of religious
tradition—which I explore at greater length below—the federal response has been
fragmented, hesitant, and incomplete. Assumptions of federalism, at least in this
domain, are turned on their head.
No federal agency has published a formal analysis of “radicalization.”
Congress has passed no law directly relating to the matter. But the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (“FBI”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) have
separately suggested definitions in the course of congressional testimony. In
addition, one Senate committee has generated reports that, while heavily dependent
on the NYPD’s efforts, try to make a distinctive contribution. In general, federal
responses have demonstrated a more tempered and careful position on religious
identity. Blanket accusations about one faith’s co-religionists are few and far
between.
The FBI has generated the least in terms of policy documents. In written
testimony delivered to Congress in May 2007, an assistant director of the FBI
explained that “consistent with the First Amendment, [the FBI] defines radical
individuals as persons who encourage, condone, justify, or support the commission
of a violent act or other crimes against the U.S. government, its citizens or its allies
for political, social, or economic ends.”53 In March 2009, FBI congressional
testimony addressed the possibility that members of Minneapolis’s SomaliAmerican community might have traveled to and from the Horn of Africa, where
they would be ideologically transformed and might be persuaded to execute
terrorist attacks in the United States. While expressing “concer[n]” about the
possibility of “recruitment of individuals” to fight in Somalia, the FBI testimony
recognized “a variety of motivations affecting such individuals.”54 Unlike the
NYPD and Pennsylvania definitions, the FBI thus does not couple religion and
terrorism tightly.
By contrast, other federal agencies have invested time and attention to the
“radicalization” problem to craft more elaborate analyses. Statements from DHS,
in particular, suggest it views “radicalization” as a nuanced and fluid process of
social transformation. Former Department of Homeland Security Secretary
Michael Chertoff declared in congressional testimony that “DHS defines
53
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radicalization as the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the
willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social
change.”55 Chertoff and other DHS officials have suggested that the Department is
careful not to define “radicalization” in religious terms. They use the term “to
encompass a wide range of threats against our country, including various white
supremacy and fascist organizations.”56 Before Congress, Chertoff rejected any
equation “of violent extremism with an entire religion such as the Muslim
religion.” Within the faith, however, Chertoff explained that:
There is a subset of individuals who we have to characterize as
violent Islamic extremists, meaning that they are adherents to an
ideology that is distinctive and has a narrative of the world. It is
one that at least uses the language of Islamic symbols; it may be a
perversion of the language, but it uses that rhetoric. And it has as a
goal acts of violence that are aimed at creating a society that will
ultimately be radically different from the one we have now, one
which is not characterized by democracy, freedom and tolerance,
but one that is characterized by intolerance and totalitarianism.57
DHS has also taken positions on the mechanisms of “radicalization.” Addressing
“Islamic radicalization,” DHS’s chief intelligence officer Charles Allen
distinguished “radicalization from terrorism by emphasizing the difference
between related social patterns that may all lead to terrorism.”58 In the same
testimony, Allen cautioned that there “are diverse ‘pathways’ to radicalization,”
rather than a “‘one-way street’” of radicalization.59
Ideology, including religious ideology, still plays a central role in the
DHS’s account. A key part of the “radicalization” path, Secretary Chertoff
explained, is that “people have to be persuaded” and “presented with a
comprehensive world narrative.”60 In that process of persuasion, Allen identified
“a variety of human and institutional catalysts, such as formal and informal
55
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religious institutions” and “[c]harismatic leaders,” and risk factors, such as
“[i]nsular communities with little exposure to moderating influences” and the
“deterioration of familial, social and societal ties” that may precipitate
“radicalization.”61 In the hearing, Allen singled out prisons and “university
group[s]” as radicalizing hubs.62
It seems the DHS’s understanding of “radicalization” is in flux. In his
March 2007 testimony, Secretary Chertoff stated that although that DHS was
taking “a comprehensive approach” to the issue, it was still working with the
academic and scientific communities in “[d]eveloping a better understanding of the
radicalization phenomenon,” including cooperating with British counterparts.63 In
late 2008, DHS issued a request for participation, asking private “experts . . . to
participate in a radicalization-research effort” to “systematically identify key
intervention strategies that can help to prevent or counter radicalization in the
United States.”64 The Department under Secretary Janet Napolitano, however, has
not published any conclusions based on that call.
Evidence about the position taken by the intelligence agencies of the
federal government, as opposed to its law enforcement arms, is relatively sparse.
One piece of evidence is a statement filed in congressional hearings respecting
Somali-Americans traveling to fight with the Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. An
official from the NCTC stated in March 2009 hearings that the decisions of these
Somali-Americans were “the result of a number of factors . . . that come together
occasionally when dynamic, influential leaders gain access to despondent,
disenfranchised young men.”65 Recruiters offer young men an alternative to gang
subculture, according to the NCTC, in the form of “religiously inspired
indoctrination to move them toward violent extremism.”66 NCTC testimony
emphasized the psychological rather than the religious dynamics of the process,
which sweeps in “vulnerable” young men, “lacking structure and definition in their
lives at home.”67 Like the DHS, the NCTC publicly articulated a multifactor model
of “radicalization” attuned to complex social and psychological nuances.
Congress, too, has started to take a position in the “radicalization” debate.
Since September 2006, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs (“Senate Homeland Security Committee”), led by Senators
Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman, has held hearings about the problem of
“domestic radicalization.” The first hearing, for example, focused on “prison
61
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radicalization.”68 In a May 2008 committee report, the Senate Homeland Security
Committee adopted the NYPD’s Radicalization in the West analysis.69 Senator
Lieberman lauded the NYPD’s analysis as a “breakthrough” that “set the standard”
for law enforcement.70
The Senate Homeland Security Committee’s contribution to the
“radicalization” literature focused on the Internet. In a May 2008 report, the
Committee concluded that the Internet “play[s] a critical role throughout the
radicalization process.”71 In the Committee’s view, the Internet is a bridge by
which radicalizing influences enter the United States. It is “the most significant
factor in the radicalization process today.”72 The Internet, on this account, is a way
for individuals to find and explore propaganda, to become indoctrinated in the
cause, and to connect “with the global Islamist terrorist movement.”73 According
to the Committee, the Internet presents new problems for law enforcement because
“self-generated violent Islamist extremists who are radicalized online” are unlikely
to come to law enforcement’s attention through real-world activities or
connections.74 The report gives two examples of the Internet’s radicalizing
potential. One involves two Georgia Tech students who made contact with a
Toronto-based group via the Internet; the other is the case of Derrick Shareef,
alleged to have been planning an explosives attack on an Illinois mall.75 In both
cases, it is unclear whether the Internet played a unique role that could not have
been played by telephone communications.
C.
The British discourse on “radicalization” emerged in a series of
government documents that outline general counterterrorism policy rather than
homing in on the problem of “radicalization.” I first outline the overall British
68
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policy framework and then document the development of an understanding of
“radicalization.”
In 2003, the Home Office, the cabinet-level entity charged with crime and
security policy, adopted a four-prong counterterrorism strategy called “Contest.”
Details of the Contest strategy, which includes analyses regarding domestic
terrorism, were released to the public in 2006 and amended in 2009. The Contest
strategy’s four overarching prongs are: preventing terrorism, pursuing terrorists,
protecting the public, and preparing the public.76 The “preventing terrorism” or
“prevent” strand, implicates the “radicalization” problem. It is not clear what
model of “radicalization” the British government used up to 2006, when the
Contest system was first released to the public. In early 2005, the Joint Terrorism
Analysis Center, part of the British security services, had developed a “three-tier
model … to describe the varying degree of connection between targets and the Al
Qaida leadership,” with the tiers corresponding to direct links, loose affiliations,
and ideological affinities.77 This three-tier model is not elaborated in any public
document, and appears to have been abandoned. There is some evidence that the
July 7, 2005 London bombings prompted a significant shift in British
understanding. According to testimony from the head of specialist operations at the
Metropolitan Police Service to Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee,
the security services had until 2005 been “working off a script which actually has
been completely discounted from what we know as reality.”78
Whatever the old script was, it was formally superseded by 2006. The first
prong of the Contest strategy, “Prevent,” is now dedicated to “preventing terrorism
by tackling the radicalisation of individuals.”79 “Prevent,” in turn is made up of
three major strands: ameliorating institutional weaknesses and gaps, hindering
76
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extremists from spreading their messages, and winning the hearts and minds of
United Kingdom’s civil society—in particular Britain’s marginalized population.
The pivotal document in the United Kingdom “radicalization” policy is a
2006 Home Office paper outlining the Contest strategy. Later Home Office papers
deal with the “Prevent” strand specifically, and give further detail about
radicalization. Finally, a 2008 paper issued by the United Kingdom’s Security
Service (MI-5) also addresses “radicalization.” The result is a rich and not entirely
consistent “discursive formation.”
i. Countering International Terrorism. The first official analysis of
radicalization by the United Kingdom government was the 2006 Home Office
strategy paper Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s
Strategy.80 Publication of this strategy paper came only two months after the
Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee warned that “across the whole
of the counter-terrorism community the development of the home-grown threat and
the radicalism of British citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic
thinking.”81 The 2006 paper can be read as a response to that challenge.
According to Countering International Terrorism, “radicalization” is the
first of two steps that may lead to violence. First, an individual alienated from
larger society adopts extreme views, thereby becoming “radicalised.”82 Second, a
“tiny minority” of these radicalized individuals become terrorists “by financing,
lending facilities to, or encouraging active terrorists, or by actively participating in
terrorist attacks.”83 The paper cautions that “[t]he processes whereby certain
experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalized, to the
extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances, are critical to
understanding how terrorist groups recruit new members and sustain support for
their activities.”84 But the report also adds that this is neither a predictable nor a
mechanical process: “There are a range of potential factors in radicalization and
no single factor predominates. It is likely the catalyst for any given individual
becoming a terrorist will be a combination of different factors particular to that
person” including a “sense of grievance and injustice,” “a sense of personal
alienation or community disadvantage,” and the “exposure to radical ideas.”85
Like the FBI and DHS approaches, Countering International Terrorism
clearly states that “radicalization” is not a unified and linear concept.86 Rather,
80
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there is a cluster of factors that may be associated with “radicalization” in
particular cases. Nor does that study assert a tight nexus between religion and
terrorism. Also implicit in its analysis is the suggestion that a person who has
embarked on the first stage of “radicalization” will not necessarily continue on to
its next stage. By further implication, “radicalization” is not a one-way ratchet like
the “funnel” posited by the NYPD report.
While the Countering International Terrorism strategy paper rejects the
notion of a predictable path to violence, it does enumerate several “[p]otentially
radicalizing factors.” These include political, social, and religious elements such
as: globalization and its economic, political, and cultural destabilizing effects;
anti-Westernism in Muslim countries, fuelled by the belief that “the West does not
apply consistent standards in its international behavior”; international incidents,
including the first and second Gulf Wars and the war in Afghanistan; personal
alienation, or economic or social disadvantage; and exposure to “radical ideas” or
an inspiring figure already committed to extremism.87 A March 2009 restatement
of the Contest strategy stated flatly that “[t]here is no single cause of
radicalization” but rather a variety of concerns, including differences on foreign
policy issues such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the treatment of detainees in
Guantánamo Bay.88 This breaks from the NYPD approach, which emphasizes faith
and personal, psychological dynamics, but makes scant mention of political
differences. It also supplements the United States federal approach, which does not
address political grievances. The British approach to “radicalization” considers the
studied form of terrorism as an example of political violence, while the American
approach to the data deracinates the problem of terrorism from any distinctively
political roots.
But by introducing a political dimension, Countering International
Terrorism creates a new ambiguity. The report distinguishes a person “who has
become highly radicalized” from “a terrorist” or a supporter of terrorism.89 That is,
“radicalization” is not defined solely in terms of attitudes to violence. The report
fails, however, to define adequately “radicalization.” Should “radicalization” be
understood as movement along a spectrum of political views or of religious views?
Countering International Terrorism gives no clear answer.
ii. The Prevent Strategy. Between 2006 and 2008, the British
government’s ideas about “radicalization” evolved. In 2006 the United Kingdom
government emphasized international dynamics and foreign policy questions. In
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2008, it highlighted more local circumstances.90
A 2008 Prevent strategy paper picks out five “interlocking factors” with
causal links to “violent extremism”: (1) “an ideology which justifies terrorism by
manipulating theology as well as history and politics”; (2) “radicalisers and their
networks”; (3) vulnerable individuals; (4) the lack of community capacity to resist
“radicalization”; and (5) perceived and actual grievances against nation and
government.91 Psychological and local factors are thus blended with international
dynamics. In a separate appendix, the document enumerates a longer list of factors
influencing “radicalization.” This annex treats “radicalization” as an individual
process, in which characteristics such as a “personal crisis,” underemployment,
social exclusion, and links to criminality are important.92 The appendix further
tethers “radicalization” to the presence of radicalizing “propagandists, ideologues,
or terrorists” and “extremist material.”93
The implicit account of “radicalization” here is closer to the American
socio-psychological model of personal crisis and resolution through conversion
than to Countering International Terrorism’s effort to take political motivations
seriously. Indeed, political motives are largely absent. Subsequent analyses of
“radicalization” published under the “Prevent” umbrella also focus on immediate
social circumstances rather than national or international political grievances.94
That change in direction raises a possibility of transnational influence and
borrowing: did American models of “radicalization,” with their focus on sociopsychological causes, influence the development of British doctrine? If so, why did
the latter borrow from the former rather than vice versa? And if the borrowing of
policies across jurisdictions does occur, is there a set of shared epistemic standards
to ensure that the superior model is adopted?
The Prevent strategy leaves several key questions unanswered. First, like
the Countering International Terrorism paper, it does not contain a clear definition
90
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of “radical” that distinguishes between political and religious metrics for
measuring extremism. Nor does it define how “radical” ideas are to be
distinguished from “moderate” ones.95 Extremists are defined, for example, as
those who “misrepresent the Islamic faith.” 96 But the strategy paper does not
explain how “correct” representations of Islam are to be identified. Second, the
Prevent strategy paper introduces a new term, “violent extremism,” to refer to what
was previously called “radicalism”97 without explaining the new term.
iii. “Radicalization” on Campus. The term “violent extremism” is,
however, discussed at more length in a Department of Education and Skills report
on “radicalization” on college campuses.98 This report defines “[u]nacceptable
extremism” as a spectrum of conduct “from incitement of social, racial or religious
hatred, to advocating the use of violence to achieve fundamental change to the
constitutional structure of the United Kingdom, to carrying out terrorist acts.” It
cautions that individuals “can and do” hold extreme views, but “authorities are
concerned [only] with any form of extremism that espouses, promotes or leads to
violence: ‘violent extremism.’”99
The terminological shift in British counterterrorism might be an effort to
concede the legitimacy, if not the wisdom, of variance from median political and
religious views, while at the same time sorting for cases in which violence is
probable. The linguistic shift is an effort, in short, to decouple the risk of violence
from the possession of disfavored religious or political views. This suggests the
British government’s sensitivity to “the importance of language and
communication” in counterterrorism.100
iv. 2008 Security Services Briefing Paper. In August 2008, British
journalists reported that the domestic British Security Service MI-5 had developed
a briefing note entitled Understanding Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the
UK “based on hundreds of case studies of those involved in or closely associated
with terrorism.”101 Like the NYPD report, expertise is claimed even as its
95
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evidentiary and methodological predicates are rendered invisible. The Security
Services have not released the report, nor is its methodology available. According
to one journalist’s account of the still-classified note:
[R]adicalisation takes months or years with no one becoming a
terrorist overnight, and it is always driven by contact with others.
Exposure to extremist ideology, whether in the form of online
communities, books, or DVDs, although crucial, is never enough
on its own. Personal interaction is essential, in most cases, to draw
individuals into violent extremist networks . . . . [Key factors
influencing receptivity included] the experience of migrating to
Britain and facing marginalization and racism; the failure of those
with degrees to achieve anything but low-grade jobs; a serious
criminal past; travel abroad for up to six months at a time and
contact with extremist networks overseas; and religious naivety.102
This analysis echoed the multifaceted FBI and DHS approaches to “radicalization”
and also a May 2006 United Kingdom parliamentary Intelligence and Security
Committee conclusion that “there is no simple Islamist extremist profile in the
United Kingdom and that the threat is as likely to come from those who appear
well assimilated into mainstream United Kingdom society, with jobs and young
families, as from those within socially or economically deprived sections of the
community.”103
III.
“Radicalization” policy in both the United States and the United Kingdom
is a work in progress. It is well on its way to coalescing into a series of conditions
that enable the gathering and evaluation of knowledge. Both governments are
moving from a standing start. The United Kingdom government candidly admitted
that its pre-2005 models of political violence were woefully lacking, despite the
fact that the United Kingdom had had long experience with terrorism as a result of
disputes over the governance of Northern Ireland. The United States government
evinced no such candor. The resulting body of literature raises questions of
epistemology, political economy, and temporal effects.
A.
First, the “radicalization” literature raises epistemic and methodological
questions. Unlike social scientists, governments are under no obligation to air their
methodology to public scrutiny and are often able to take advantage of a
presumption of accuracy, especially in matters such as national security.104 Indeed,
102
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national security bureaucrats are typically among those viewed by the public as
models of “selfless administrators”105 whose claims to impartial understanding are
quickly credited. And when pressed, the government can always reject criticisms
by claiming to know more than can be revealed to the public. This may be the case
even if there are methodological or logical flaws in the government’s empirical
assumptions. But terrorism presents particularly acute epistemic problems:
terrorists are not transparent about their intentions, particularly to the state; post
hoc accounts from perpetrators about their motives merit skepticism; and many of
the normal tools of empirical analysis are unavailable.
Consider in this light the NYPD and Pennsylvania reports. Numerous
problems are facially apparent with the logic of the NYPD’s analysis. First, several
of the “typical signatures” mentioned in the report are pervasive in the general
population, for instance the accumulation of facial hair and poor housekeeping
skills. Treating facts that are pervasive in the ambient population as indicia of
terrorist risk loosens constraints on investigative discretion. If almost everyone is a
suspect, allocations of investigative resources may be distorted by many factors,
including invidious animus.
A second question arises because some of the putative signals of terrorist
risk identified in the report are tied to Islamic tradition and custom, e.g., adoption
of Islamic garb. Recall, however, that the report takes “Islamic-based terrorism” as
its sole subject at the outset.106 It combines the breadth of a global focus with a
narrow lens that picks up only incidents that it links to Islam. This methodology is
known in the empirical literature as purposive sampling, which (unlike random
sampling) involves “complete discretion” on a researcher’s part as to which
observations to include in a study.107 Having decided to disregard the full spectrum
of contemporary terrorist groups and events available within a global sample
frame,108 and to select only for links to Islam, a researcher cannot then assert that
the occurrence of Islamic traits or behavior are correlated with a dependent
variable such as the threat of terrorist violence. To the contrary, any correlation is
the result of the manner in which the sample was selected from the population.
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A third concern relates to the facts of the selected cases. The NYPD report
mixes studies of completed terrorism conspiracies with incidents in which an
attack was apparently forestalled; it discusses both realized and potential threats.
Including potential threats, however, raises selection concerns. A journalistic
account of the events in Lackawanna, New York—one of the incidents studied in
the report—has cast doubt on whether those arrested ever intended to commit a
terrorist attack.109 A plea bargain in a highly visible and emotional terrorism
prosecution, chronologically and geographically proximate to the 9/11 attacks, is
not a substitute for evidence of actual risk. Worse still, some of the case studies
involve facts in part crafted by the police. In one of the New York City conspiracy
arrests, police relied on evidence from an informant working for the government
who encouraged and aided the eventual defendant.110 Questions of coercion,
entrapment, and the perverse incentives implicated by the use of informants are
beyond the scope of this paper. But informants are relevant insofar as they have
influence on the cases chosen for prosecution and the facts of those cases.
Informants and their police handlers select targets. In the terrorism context,
informants play large roles in planning and encouraging attacks. In relying on
cases involving informants—including one in New York City—the NYPD report
thus relies on facts created by the police themselves. This is a feedback loop: the
police influence the content and direction of prosecutions and then rely on those
prosecutions as evidence of the underlying crime problem.
These three analytic concerns are compounded by the NYPD report’s
studied ambiguity on questions of methodology. In a section on methodology, the
report explained that the NYPD “dispatched detectives and analysts to meet with
law enforcement, intelligence officials and academics” at locations of terrorist
attacks or conspiracies.111 Despite this, it is hard to link primary empirical research
to the contents of the report. The 143 footnotes of the report contain no reference
to any interviews (even with names omitted); instead the 143 footnotes direct
readers to five books, three court documents, and a mass of newspaper articles.112
Parts of the report do not identify their sources; nor are any non-public sources
apparent from the arguments and facts presented in the text. The report does not
allow for careful parsing of its empirical claims, even though there is no reason
why the first-hand sources relied upon could not have been identified, at least
through pseudonyms.113
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Opacity about the sources of knowledge matters. The manner in which
knowledge is derived influences conclusions. This is illustrated in Foucault’s
landmark study of the birth of modern medicine. In that work, the French historian
emphasized a paradigm change in the manner in which medical knowledge was
being produced. After this rupture, physicians elevated the “privileges of a pure
gaze, prior to all intervention and faithful to the immediate … and those of a gaze
with a whole logical armature, which exorcised from the outset the naivety of an
unprepared empiricism.”114 That is, the choice of methodology was linked to a
resistance to seeing the possible significance of methodological selection. The
“radicalization” literature has a similar double structure to the one Foucault
describes. Reports assert a disinterested, neutral gaze, implicitly asserting a
technocratic expertise to vouchsafe the resulting conclusions, while at the same
time erasing from the record all traces of method—traces that would enable
critique and challenge.
It is legitimate to ask whether ambient bias—or even simple aversion to a
religious faith that is generally unfamiliar and unknown—distorts analytic
outcomes. Both the NYPD and the Pennsylvania documents tie Islam to terrorism
at the outset. They posit a categorical linkage between that faith and political
violence. In this fashion, neither is “mere unconditioned ratiocination”115 without
preconditions because both documents treat the “Muslim” a priori as a source of
risk and harm. Both extend a long intellectual history that Edward Said has most
famously excavated, a history that is based on “the ineradicable distinction
between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority.”116 That categorical divide is
enacted both by the decision to couple Islam and terror in the analytic categories
and by the sampling methodology.
Consider by way of example the Pennsylvania training manual’s treatment
of religious texts and identity. Like the NYPD’s report, the Pennsylvania manual
assimilates religious motives to terrorism by singling out “radical Islam” from
other justificatory accounts of terrorism at the threshold. It then backs away from
this conflation. For example, the training manual states early on that “most
Muslims are not jihadis.”117 But then in describing the doctrinal tenets of Islam, it
makes the sweeping assertion that under the Qur’an, “[f]ighting was then
sanctioned against all those who worshipped others along with Allah” and that “it
became an obligation to fight against all those who do not believe in Allah.”118 By
stating that “Muslims believe that Muhammad is the best exemplar . . . in all
circumstances” and then quoting a non-Qur’anic passage in which Muhammad
reports. See, e.g., id. at 22-28 (describing first stage of five conspiracies).
114
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orders the execution of non-Muslim prisoners of war, the training manual suggests
that violence against non-believers is generally endorsed by Islamic texts.119 The
manual fails to consider the status of the non-Qur’anic passage as a binding text,
and says nothing about its possible divergent readings. Through its description of
Islam, the manual also highlights arguments and canonical stories that can be used
to argue for violence.120 Although the training manual does add the caveat that
only “[r]adical individuals” will focus on the violent passages and ideas, the caveat
serves more as a way of fending of accusations of bias, rather than a meaningful
attempt to dispel the suggestion that these justifications are endorsed by Muslims
generally. To the contrary, it claims precisely that. For example, it asserts that
“[t]he motivation to engage in jihad is based on concepts [sic] that jihad is the ‘best
deed’ a Muslim can perform.”121
By failing to mention a large body of literature repudiating those
arguments,122 the training manual implies that Muslims in general have a warrant
for terrorist violence in their religious beliefs and texts that is distinct in scale and
type from the warrant for political violence furnished by other religious texts such
as the Bible or the Torah. Islam is again configured as distinctively dangerous and
violent.123
B.
It is one thing to critique governments’ approach to modeling
“radicalization;” it is another to explain observed variance in approaches to
religious and ethnic identity. The second question thus raised by the
“radicalization” literature, therefore, is one of political economy: even given the
small size of the sample policies, what can be discerned about the political and
social forces generating different discursive formations?
The “radicalization” literature is not the product of disinterested experts,
but emerged in the context of local and transnational political economies. In the
United States, it emerged against the backdrop of interjurisdictional competition
between states and with the federal government. Internationally, it unfurls against
tensions and negotiations between nations in both counter-terrorism and other
security needs. I have mentioned above the possibility of transnational learning
119
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between the American and British governments regarding models of
“radicalization,” which might explain the shift in the British discourse from overtly
political explanations to more local and psychological accounts. If such transAtlantic borrowing does happen, it would be important to know the criteria for
success in the ensuing tournament of ideas.124
A political economy of “radicalization” might begin by observing the
greater influence of British Muslims as compared to their American counterparts.
Muslim communities in the United Kingdom are longstanding, powerful, and
organized in ways not familiar in the American political scene. The British Muslim
community first comprised Yemeni, Malaysian, Bengali, and southern Arabian
migrants who arrived and settled in the late 1800s in port cities such as Cardiff and
Liverpool.125 Substantial British Muslim populations began to develop in the
1960s and 1970s. The number of mosques in the United Kingdom leapt from 13 in
1963 to 339 in 1985.126 According to the last national census (2001), 2.7 percent
of the British population was Muslim. Of that, 68 percent was of South Asian
extraction.127 British Muslim populations are characterized by lower-than-median
socio-economic indicators. They also face more constrained social mobility than
other British immigrant or autochthonous communities.128 They are also subject
to high levels of racial animus and cultural stigmatization. As in other European
countries, these frictions often coalesce around manifest and visible symbols of
difference, such as the women’s use of niqabs or hijabs.129 Yet Muslims have
successfully entered the professions and politics in recent years, and have visible
presences in the United Kingdom: in 2003, two Muslims secured seats in the
House of Commons, and five Muslims have been appointed to the House of
Lords.130 More widely, “[g]rowing numbers of Muslims have come to regard
formal political mechanisms as an effective way of getting their problems
addressed.”131
124

The problem of borrowing between jurisdictions is extensively studied in
constitutional law. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons:
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005). See also Ernest A.
Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005).
125
HUMAYUN ANSARI, THE INFIDEL WITHIN: MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1800 24-30
(2004); Hisham A. Hellyer, British Muslims: Past, Present and Future, 97 MUSLIM
WORLD 225, 229-30 (2007); Ceri Peach, Britain’s Muslim Population: An Overview, in
MUSLIM BRITAIN: COMMUNITIES UNDER PRESSURE 18-19 (Tahir Abbas, ed., 2005).
126
Hellyer, supra note 125, at 230.
127
Peach, supra note 125, at 20.
128
Tahir Abbas, Muslim Minorities in Britain: Integration, Multiculturalism, and
Radicalism in the Post-7/7 Period, 28 J. INTERCULTURAL STUD. 287, 289 (2007); see also
HUMAYAN ANSARI, MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN 8-11 (Minority Rights International, 2002),
http://www.minorityrights.org/1014/reports/muslims-in-britain.html, (describing persistent
inequalities in housing, education, and employment markets). SN
129
Alan Cowell, For Multiculturalist Britain, Uncomfortable New Clothes, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at c3.
130
Hellyer, supra note 125, at 233.
131
Ansari, supra note 128, at 18.

Modeling Radicalization

27

As a result, it is more costly for the British government than for the
American government to slight or to be perceived as slighting Muslim interests.
Instead, the British government claims it has sought the input of its Muslim
community constituents. In the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings, the
U.K. government launched an initiative called “Preventing Extremism Together”
“to engage and consult with Muslim communities” concerning future policy
responses to domestic terrorist concerns.132 The U.K. government convened seven
working groups during the summer of 2007, each directed by a nationally- or
locally-prominent Muslim leader. Each group drafted a report with substantive
policy suggestions, case studies of successful community-government
collaborations, and recommendations for legal reform.133 While the Home Office
publicly welcomed the input,134 the reports had little tangible impact on subsequent
government policies. Working groups’ leaders later criticized the United Kingdom
government for moving ahead with policy initiatives before even receiving their
reports.135 A British security scholar has characterized United Kingdom strategy
as akin to “classic counter-insurgency policies that aim to divide extremists from
the moderate majority Muslim community . . . by engaging with moderate Muslim
groups . . . [by utilizing] consultations with and closer regulation of local Muslim
leaders and Imams; and greater contact with Muslim representatives to address
Muslim concerns over the use of counterterrorism methods.”136 Consultations, and
botched attempts to consult, are well understood as part of that divide-and-conquer
strategy, and not as genuine efforts at gathering new information.
Concern about the electoral mobilization or otherwise adverse reaction of
Muslim voters may also push the British government to pay close attention to its
analysis’s implications about Islam and terrorism. The British government has
resisted the kind of quick connections drawn in the NYPD report between Islam
and terrorism. Both Countering International Terrorism and the Prevent strategy
paper cautiously identify a connection between Islam and terrorism. Countering
International Terrorism states that “a distorted and unrepresentative version of the
Islamic faith [has been used] to justify violence.”137 The Prevent strategy paper
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explains that terrorism is promoted by those who “misrepresent” Islam.138
Following the lead of these documents, the Department of Education and Skills
cautions that “[a] clear distinction should be made between . . . extremist
individuals and the faith they might claim to be associated with or represent.”139
The same report observed that “propagating false perceptions about the values and
beliefs of Islam potentially adds to a vicious circle that may fuel discrimination
and islamophobia.”140 None of the American literature on “radicalization”
demonstrates awareness or concern about the possibility of populist backlash
against Muslim-Americans.141
Conceptual separation of the main body of Islam from religious
justifications given for terrorism minimizes any spillover legitimization effect on
ambient discrimination. That separation also serves a strategic purpose by
narrowing the perceived constituency for terrorist violence. The “populationcentric” approach to counter-terrorism, popularized by apparent successes in Iraq
in recent years, has prioritized the security of local populations and the legitimacy
of counter-terror efforts in ending insurgent groups.142
In recent documents, the United Kingdom government has moved beyond
an effort to disconnect religion from violence, and has instead drawn on empirical
evidence that suggests that a deficit of religious knowledge presents a concern with
respect to questions of “radicalization.” Professor Tufyal Choudhury pioneered this
argument in an April 2007 paper for the government office for Communities and
Local Government. In The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation,
Choudhury aggregated research about why people commit acts of violence,
focusing on the role of religion.143 Examining studies of groups such as AlMuhajiroun and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Choudhury argued that research showed that “the
path to [radicalization] often involves a search for identity in a moment of
crisis.”144 Whether because it is intrinsically belligerent or because it provides
marginalized and disparaged communities with increased in-group solidarity, the
identity of “Muslim” has proven increasingly attractive in recent decades.145
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Drawing on Quintan Wiktorowicz’s pioneering study of the Salafist group AlMuhajiroun, Choudhury also observed that those attracted to marginal religious
groups “are not particularly religious and do not have any significant religious
education,” and “a lack of religious literacy and education appears to be a common
feature among those that are drawn to extremist groups.”146 This second, more
general, conclusion about the role of religious naïveté rests on data about AlMuhajiroun’s recruitment dynamics, which might be atypical of terrorism groups
(especially as Al-Muhajiroun itself disavows any violent intent). Further, there is
some contrary data suggesting high degrees of religiosity among terrorists who
self-identify with Islam from their youth.147 Despite this uncertainty, the paper
recommended that “Muslims will be better equipped to counter violent
[radicalization] when they have the knowledge and ideas about their faith with
which to confront extremists.”148
Other governmental entities have reached similar conclusions. The Prevent
strategy paper flags a “need to develop a stronger understanding of Islam and
Islamic culture, society and history across all communities.”149 In leaked portions
of its August 2008 briefing note, the security agency MI-5 listed “religious
naivety” as a factor in cases where individuals have turned to violence.150 In
2005, the government-sponsored Working Group on Young People observed that
“much learning [among British Muslims] about Islam is autodidactic” rather than
through mosques or family, which creates “opportunities for the propagation of
extremist ideologies.”151 The correlative to this observation, noted another
Working Group, was that the Muslim community has a “responsibility to try to
ensure that the culture of radical ideas and influence” is eliminated, a responsibility
not generally shared with other faith communities.152 One response to the problem
is “disseminating a more authentic understanding of Islam.”153 Another 2007
report based on focus groups with Muslim Londoners identified local imams,
many of whom migrate with little understanding of Western social conditions and
problems, as causes of the vacuum in religious understanding. That report
explained: “[B]y refusing to engage with young Muslims on contentious issues of
concern to those young people, [imams] were forcing hungry young minds out
onto the streets for answers.”154
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A political-economy approach must consider not only private interest
groups, but also the interactions between different levels of government and
different institutions within the government. One example of the difference that
political economy makes in the distribution and form of knowledge about
counterterrorism is the reversal of traditional federal and state roles in the United
States. In contrast to the prevailing wisdom, it has been a state rather than the
federal government that has taken the initiative on “radicalization,” sometimes
seen as one of the most important national security issues of the day. Generally,
state-level innovation in policy is considered a public good.155 Not all state-level
innovation, however, is to be encouraged. Some “incentive to deviate from the
division of authority is inescapably built into the federal structure,” creating
negative interstate spillovers.156 The deviations may shift regulatory burdens onto
other states, or they can create externalities for the nation as a whole.
Consider one account of the interjurisdictional “contestation”157 underlying
the genesis of state-level “radicalization” policy. I cannot prove this account.
Rather, I offer it as a hypothesis supported by at last some circumstantial evidence,
one that allows for critical examination of the political economy of the
“radicalization discourse.” The account focuses on bureaucratic rivalries between
the federal and state level. On this account, the NYPD report is part of a larger
move to establish the Department’s priority as the premier counterterrorism agency
within the United States. The NYPD has long contested the superiority of the FBI
in a protracted and “counterproductive bureaucratic struggle.”158 The August 2007
“radicalization” report was a preemptive strike in that struggle, a bid to cement the
legitimacy of a local police department’s intelligence and counterterrorism
efforts.159 In addition to studying “radicalization,” the NYPD has cultivated
flattering press for its counterterrorism efforts. This includes a New Yorker article
that focused almost exclusively on the Department’s perspective.160 A recent book
155
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on the NYPD’s counterterrorism efforts also trumpeted the Department as the
nation’s “Best Counterterror Force” and gave little space even for discussion of
substantial civil-liberties concerns raised by the Department’s policies.161 In short,
the NYPD report can be read as part of a larger campaign being waged for policy
primacy between jurisdictions within the United States.
Why should a state fight such a battle? Preeminence has practical
advantages for individual states. Praising the NYPD report, Senator Lieberman
added that “Congress must ensure adequate funding” for local law enforcement;
presumably, the NYPD will be nearer the front of the federal funding line than it
would otherwise be, given the support of a key Senate committee chairman.162 But
the NYPD’s approach also creates a new version of the spillover problem.
Specifically, the NYPD’s approach may be attractive because it appeals to those
with a priori animus against Muslims. Even if the report’s authors are not affected
by bias, their work may provide confirmation for those who are so affected. To the
extent that a flawed analysis is as a result adopted in whole or part by other states,
a higher rate of civil and constitutional rights violations and inefficient allocations
of policing resources may follow.
To the extent that the NYPD’s report can be read as a bid for national
legitimacy, it is also an effort to circumvent local Muslim constituencies. The
British experience suggests that the presence of a large Muslim population forces a
government to pay a higher marginal political cost for claiming a connection
between Islam and terrorism. State governments are more likely than national
governments to have politically significant groups of Muslim-Americans who may
take offense at their faith being thus impugned.163 There is also a literature in
American constitutional law that suggests local governmental units will be more
protective of religious liberty than the federal government.164 And yet, the
opposite appears to be the case in the context of “radicalization” policy because of
a local government’s ability to appeal to a national constituency.
Complicating the political economy picture further, Muslim-American
political mobilization is in rapid flux. The Muslim-American community is more
varied than is generally assumed.165 The decennial national census does not
161
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contain a question about faith. This renders it hard to gauge the number of
Muslims in the United States. Estimates range from 1.1 million to 7 million.166
According to a 2007 Pew Research Center survey, about 65 percent of MuslimAmericans are first-generation immigrants, while 20 percent are second-generation
with one or both parents living outside the United States.167 Large Muslim
communities of considerable sectarian diversity are scattered across the county’s
urban areas, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, and the Dallas/Fort
Worth/Houston area. Political mobilization among Muslim-American groups dates
generally back to the 1996 elections. While in 2000 majorities of South Asian and
Middle Eastern Muslims supported the Republican ticket, in 2004 they switched
sides.168 One study estimates that they may “have a potential to make a political
impact in swing states such as Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio” in future elections.169
I have postulated above that British Muslims influenced the content and direction
of British “radicalization” strategy by dint of political voice. Analogously, it is
possible to imagine that the American Muslim political voice at the national level
may influence the content of “radicalization” policy in the United States in a way
that until now has been impossible to discern.
C.
The third and final question is whether “radicalization” literature will
directly affect policy. The exercise of “epistemological power” 170 by the state in
this fashion has the potential to affect the direction and intensity of policy, as well
as to shape the portfolio of political and religious identities available to a larger
community of co-religionists or an ethnic cohort.
In the context of counterterrorism policy, the understanding of what a
“terrorist” is and—significantly—how someone becomes a “terrorist” impinges on
the allocation of investigative and policing resources in several ways. First,
different understandings will influence the use of controversial investigative
measures such as the surveillance of mosques and the recruitment of imams as
informants.171 Police will spend more time cultivating religious leaders as
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informants if they are told, or otherwise believe, that religious texts and beliefs
play a catalytic part in “radicalization.” A model of “radicalization” that implicates
religion, therefore, will tend to shift the distribution of policing resources toward
these more controversial measures. Recent changes to the FBI’s domestic
surveillance guidelines proposed by former Attorney General Michael Mukasey
illustrate one possible vector for this kind of policy change. These amendments
relax procedural constraints on the use of direct surveillance or informants in
religious spaces.172 They enable a new balancing of religious liberties against
security concerns.
Second, the “radicalization” discourse may influence front-end decisions
about what conduct to criminalize, or charging decisions under inchoate statutes,
such as the material support to terrorism provisions.173 Elastic, inchoate statutes
may be applied to cases involving religious conduct with increasing frequency if
the latter is adjudged by the state to be a proxy for terrorist threat. Accounts of
domestic-source “radicalization” might also distort aggregate resource allocations
among divergent catastrophic threats because they amplify cognitive biases.174
Emphasizing a threat that involves a betrayal of communal confidences at
moments—on public transport or at work, for example—where a threat was not
expected may yield different allocations of limited security resources.
Third, different understandings of the relation of terrorism to religious or
ethnic identity may alter tolerance levels for ambient discrimination within
governmental institutions. Supervisors may be less concerned about line officers
who exercise their discretion in discriminatory ways.175
Some evidence of how “radicalization” might be operationalized has
emerged in Los Angeles. There, in response to concerns about “radicalization,” the
Police Department initiated a “community mapping” plan to “lay out the
geographic locations of the many different Muslim populations around Los
Angeles . . . [and t]o take a deeper look at their history, demographics, language,
culture, ethnic breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions” so as to
“identify communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be
susceptible to violent ideologically-based extremism.”176 The Los Angeles Police
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Chief explained that the department also intended to collect information on
“languages used in a certain area, the employment rate,” and “who and where the
city’s Muslim communities are.”177 This mapping project might be seen as one
way of operationalizing the “radicalization” discourse. The epistemological project
of understanding terrorism becomes the different epistemological effort to know
Muslims.
The plan, however, prompted public criticism from Muslim community
groups and civil liberties advocates. Citing the “fear and apprehension” prompted
by the plan’s public disclosure, Los Angles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa declared
that it would not be put into effect.178 Yet, much of its framework has been
adopted in a new police reporting system used by Los Angeles police to identify
terrorist threats via the filter of standardized “suspicious activity reports.”179 Just
as the NYPD’s “radicalization” report influenced Congress, so, too, the Los
Angeles effort is proving influential within the FBI, which is considering adoption
of the “suspicious activity report” framework.180
Policy consequences of “radicalization” analysis thus drift between
jurisdictions. Federalism, far from being a shield for individual liberties, may be a
cause of erosion of those liberties as local jurisdictions, seeking reputational gain,
compete to generate tougher and more potentially intrusive policies for adoption
on the national level.
Finally, “radicalization” cannot be reduced to a matter of “labeling from
above.”181 Rather, it would be wise to recall Foucault’s insistence that power is
not reducible to domination and hierarchy. As he stressed in his work on sexuality,
the exercise of power is dispersed, and involves work and investment on the part of
power’s subjects as much as its objects.182 Following Foucault, one must attend to
the opportunities that the new discourse of “radicalization” presents for its
subjects. At its edges, “radicalization” creates a zone of semantic uncertainty
where symbols of faith serve equally as signals of violence. For the suspected
classes, that is, “the outer reaches of [their] space as . . . [individuals] are
(statement of Deputy Chief Michael P. Downing, Counter-Terrorism Crim. Intelligence
Bureau.
Los
Angeles
Police
Dep’t).
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essentially different from what they would have been had these possibilities not
come into being.”183
Yet it would be a mistake to conceptualize this as a form of simple
repression. To be sure, “radicalization” changes the marginal cost of certain forms
of religious behavior and thereby may create a disincentive to communal or
individual forms of faith. But “radicalization” also creates opportunities for those
seeking to establish normative distance from the state. The state supplies its own
counter-narrative by legitimizing certain forms of resistance over others. Rather
than repression, “radicalization” can be seen, perhaps not without irony, as a path
of resistance and individuation through the tailoring of a ready-made mold of
countercultural resistance. It remains to be seen how these openings and resources
are leveraged in the creation of new political and religious identities.
Conclusion
To understand the forms that emerging approaches to counterterrorism
take, it is necessary to look to epistemic foundations. The “radicalization”
literature shows those foundations in process of formation. Its study implicates
novel epistemological, political-economy, and legal questions. Further research is
needed to understand this new, and increasingly significant, determinant of
counterterrorism policy.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Aziz Z. Huq
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1111 East 60th Street
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